fp-check

False Positive Check — MANDATORY Pre-Submission Verification

When to Use

Before ANY finding is submitted. No exceptions. This is the final gate.

When NOT to Use

• Finding or hunting for bugs (use Hunter workflow instead)
• General code review for style/performance
• Feature development or non-security tasks

Rationalizations to Reject

| Rationalization | Why It Is Wrong | Action | |---|---|---| | "This pattern looks dangerous" | Pattern recognition is not analysis | Trace actual data flow | | "Similar code was vulnerable elsewhere" | Each context differs | Verify this specific instance | | "This is clearly critical" | LLMs are biased toward seeing bugs | Complete devil's advocate | | "Skipping verification for efficiency" | No partial analysis allowed | Run all gates |

Step 0: Restate the Claim

Restate the vulnerability in one precise sentence. If you cannot, it's likely false.

• What: exact vulnerability type and root cause
• Where: file:line of the sink
• How: data flow from attacker input to sink
• Impact: concrete security consequence
• Who: attacker privilege level required
• Bug class: consult references/bug-class-verification.md

Half of false positives collapse at this step — the claim doesn't make coherent sense.

Route: Standard vs Deep

Standard — clear claim, single component, well-understood bug class, no concurrency. Deep — ambiguous claim, cross-component flow, race conditions, logic bugs, or standard was inconclusive.

Start with Standard. It has built-in escalation checkpoints.

6-Gate Review — ALL Must Pass

Gate 1: Process Completeness

• [ ] Source identified (where attacker input enters)
• [ ] Sink identified (where dangerous operation occurs)
• [ ] Complete data flow traced source to sink
• [ ] All transformations/validations documented

Gate 2: Reachability

• [ ] Attacker can reach the vulnerable endpoint
• [ ] Attacker controls the data that reaches the sink
• [ ] No auth barrier blocks access (or bypass is part of finding)
• [ ] Input is not sanitized before reaching sink

Gate 3: Real Impact

• [ ] Exploitation produces real security consequences
• [ ] Impact exceeds what attacker could already do at their privilege level
• [ ] Behavior is NOT documented/intended design
• [ ] Impact manifests in observable behavior

Gate 4: PoC Validation

• [ ] PoC runs successfully against latest version
• [ ] PoC succeeds 3/3 times (fail 3x = FALSE POSITIVE, no exceptions)
• [ ] Evidence matches claimed impact exactly
• [ ] Default configuration only

Gate 5: Math / Bounds

• [ ] For DoS: growth rate is actually exponential/quadratic (not linear)
• [ ] For overflow: values actually exceed the boundary
• [ ] For ReDoS: backtracking is catastrophic (>1s for reasonable input)
• [ ] For bombs: expansion ratio is dangerous (>100x)

Gate 6: Environment

• [ ] Runtime does NOT block this at a lower level
• [ ] Framework middleware does NOT sanitize automatically
• [ ] OS-level protections do NOT prevent exploitation
• [ ] Default security headers do NOT mitigate

13-Item False Positive Checklist

| # | Check | If YES | |---|-------|--------| | 1 | README warns against untrusted input? | Gray area — document it | | 2 | Documented/intended behavior? | FALSE POSITIVE | | 3 | Library handles this gracefully? | FALSE POSITIVE | | 4 | Alpha/beta/pre-release? | Unlikely to get CVE | | 5 | JSON.parse does the same? | Show REAL crash beyond JSON.parse | | 6 | OOM crash or caught RangeError? | RangeError = lower severity | | 7 | Requires admin privileges? | Check if access is genuinely new | | 8 | Exact version already patched? | DUPLICATE | | 9 | Framework sanitizes at middleware? | FALSE POSITIVE | | 10 | Runtime blocks this? | FALSE POSITIVE | | 11 | >10 prior CVEs on this project? | Over-audited — proceed with caution | | 12 | Different package with similar name? | Verify exact package | | 13 | Only works with non-default config? | Severity drops significantly |

Devil's Advocate — 7 Questions

1. Am I seeing a vulnerability because the pattern "looks dangerous"?
2. Am I incorrectly assuming attacker control over trusted data?
3. Am I hallucinating this? LLMs are biased toward seeing bugs everywhere.
4. Am I dismissing complexity that makes exploitation impractical?
5. Am I inventing mitigations I haven't verified in source code?
6. Am I conflating "unsafe-looking code" with "exploitable vulnerability"?
7. Would a senior security researcher at Trail of Bits agree this is real?

Verdict Format

VERDICT: TRUE POSITIVE / FALSE POSITIVE / NEEDS MORE INFO

Gates passed: X/6
Checklist flags: [list any concerns]
Devil's advocate: [key doubt and resolution]
Evidence: [concrete proof]
Confidence: HIGH / MEDIUM / LOW

References

• [Standard Verification](references/standard-verification.md)
• [Deep Verification](references/deep-verification.md)
• [Gate Reviews](references/gate-reviews.md)
• [Bug-Class Verification](references/bug-class-verification.md)
• [False Positive Patterns](references/false-positive-patterns.md)
• [Evidence Templates](references/evidence-templates.md)