robotics-security

Robotics Security Skill

When to Use This Skill

• Enabling SROS2 encryption and access control on ROS2 topics/services
• Generating keystores, certificates, and security policies for DDS
• Hardening robot onboard computers (SSH, firewalls, minimal packages)
• Setting up network segmentation between robot control/data/management planes
• Managing secrets and credentials across a robot fleet
• Securing Docker containers running ROS2 nodes
• Designing e-stop and safety systems that survive cyber compromise
• Auditing a robot system for security vulnerabilities
• Implementing secure boot and firmware verification
• Addressing IEC 62443 requirements for industrial robot deployments

The Robot Attack Surface

Robots are unique: cyber vulnerabilities become physical threats.

  NETWORK                    MIDDLEWARE                   APPLICATION
  ┌────────────────┐        ┌────────────────┐           ┌────────────────┐
  │ Open DDS ports │───────▶│ Unauthenticated│──────────▶│ Hardcoded      │
  │ (7400-7500)    │        │ /cmd_vel pub   │           │ credentials    │
  │ Unsegmented LAN│        │ No msg signing │           │ Unvalidated cmd│
  └────────────────┘        └────────────────┘           └────────────────┘
  PHYSICAL                   FIRMWARE                     SUPPLY CHAIN
  ┌────────────────┐        ┌────────────────┐           ┌────────────────┐
  │ USB/debug ports│───────▶│ Unsigned       │──────────▶│ Compromised    │
  │ Serial consoles│        │ firmware OTA   │           │ ROS packages   │
  │ Exposed SBCs   │        │ No secure boot │           │ Unverified imgs│
  └────────────────┘        └────────────────┘           └────────────────┘

| Vector | Impact | |--------|--------| | Unauthenticated /cmd_vel | Robot moves unexpectedly — injury/damage | | Sensor spoofing (/scan, /camera/image) | Robot collides, wrong decisions | | Open DDS multicast discovery | Full topic graph enumeration by passive listener | | USB/serial physical access | Root shell, firmware flash, data exfiltration | | Unsigned firmware update | Persistent backdoor in motor controllers |

SROS2: DDS Security

SROS2 wraps DDS Security to provide authentication, encryption, and access control at the DDS layer.

Keystore Generation and Certificate Setup

export ROS_SECURITY_KEYSTORE=~/sros2_keystore
ros2 security create_keystore ${ROS_SECURITY_KEYSTORE}

# Generate per-node enclaves (use exact fully-qualified node names)
ros2 security create_enclave ${ROS_SECURITY_KEYSTORE} /my_robot/camera_driver
ros2 security create_enclave ${ROS_SECURITY_KEYSTORE} /my_robot/navigation
ros2 security create_enclave ${ROS_SECURITY_KEYSTORE} /my_robot/motor_controller
ros2 security create_enclave ${ROS_SECURITY_KEYSTORE} /my_robot/teleop

# Result:
# sros2_keystore/
# ├── enclaves/my_robot/{camera_driver,navigation,...}/
# │   ├── cert.pem, key.pem          # Node identity
# │   ├── governance.p7s              # Signed governance
# │   └── permissions.p7s             # Signed permissions
# ├── public/ca.cert.pem              # CA certificate
# └── private/ca.key.pem              # CA private key — PROTECT THIS

Security Policy XML

Governance — domain-wide security behavior:

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<dds xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
     xsi:noNamespaceSchemaLocation="omg_shared_ca_governance.xsd">
  <domain_access_rules>
    <domain_rule>
      <domains><id_range><min>0</min><max>230</max></id_range></domains>
      <allow_unauthenticated_participants>false</allow_unauthenticated_participants>
      <enable_join_access_control>true</enable_join_access_control>
      <discovery_protection_kind>ENCRYPT</discovery_protection_kind>
      <liveliness_protection_kind>ENCRYPT</liveliness_protection_kind>
      <rtps_protection_kind>ENCRYPT</rtps_protection_kind>
      <topic_access_rules>
        <topic_rule>
          <topic_expression>*</topic_expression>
          <enable_discovery_protection>true</enable_discovery_protection>
          <enable_read_access_control>true</enable_read_access_control>
          <enable_write_access_control>true</enable_write_access_control>
          <metadata_protection_kind>ENCRYPT</metadata_protection_kind>
          <data_protection_kind>ENCRYPT</data_protection_kind>
        </topic_rule>
      </topic_access_rules>
    </domain_rule>
  </domain_access_rules>
</dds>

Permissions — per-enclave publish/subscribe rules:

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<dds xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
     xsi:noNamespaceSchemaLocation="omg_shared_ca_permissions.xsd">
  <permissions>
    <grant name="/my_robot/motor_controller">
      <subject_name>CN=/my_robot/motor_controller</subject_name>
      <validity><not_before>2024-01-01T00:00:00</not_before>
                <not_after>2026-01-01T00:00:00</not_after></validity>
      <allow_rule>
        <domains><id>0</id></domains>
        <publish><topics><topic>rt/joint_states</topic></topics></publish>
        <subscribe><topics><topic>rt/cmd_vel</topic></topics></subscribe>
      </allow_rule>
      <default>DENY</default>
    </grant>
    <grant name="/my_robot/teleop">
      <subject_name>CN=/my_robot/teleop</subject_name>
      <validity><not_before>2024-01-01T00:00:00</not_before>
                <not_after>2026-01-01T00:00:00</not_after></validity>
      <allow_rule>
        <domains><id>0</id></domains>
        <publish><topics><topic>rt/cmd_vel</topic></topics></publish>
        <subscribe><topics><topic>rt/joy</topic></topics></subscribe>
      </allow_rule>
      <default>DENY</default>
    </grant>
  </permissions>
</dds>

Enabling Security in Launch Files

import os
from launch import LaunchDescription
from launch_ros.actions import Node

def generate_launch_description():
    security_env = {
        'ROS_SECURITY_KEYSTORE': os.path.expanduser('~/sros2_keystore'),
        'ROS_SECURITY_ENABLE': 'true',
        'ROS_SECURITY_STRATEGY': 'Enforce',  # Enforce=reject unauth, Permissive=warn only
    }
    return LaunchDescription([
        Node(package='my_robot_drivers', executable='motor_controller',
             name='motor_controller', namespace='my_robot',
             additional_env=security_env),
        Node(package='my_robot_nav', executable='navigation',
             name='navigation', namespace='my_robot',
             additional_env=security_env),
    ])

Always use Enforce in production. Permissive logs violations but allows them — debugging aid only.

Per-Topic Access Control

Design with least privilege:

| Node | Publishes | Subscribes | Rationale | |------|-----------|------------|-----------| | motor_controller | /joint_states | /cmd_vel | Driver acts on velocity only | | navigation | /cmd_vel, /path | /scan, /odom, /map | Nav reads sensors, writes commands | | camera_driver | /camera/image_raw | (none) | Pure source — no subscriptions | | teleop | /cmd_vel | /joy | Joystick passthrough — minimal surface |

A compromised camera_driver cannot publish to /cmd_vel — permissions deny it at the DDS layer.

Network Hardening

Network Segmentation

┌───────────────────┬──────────────────┬────────────────────────┐
│   CONTROL PLANE   │   DATA PLANE     │   MANAGEMENT PLANE     │
│   VLAN 10         │   VLAN 20        │   VLAN 30              │
│   10.10.10.0/24   │   10.10.20.0/24  │   10.10.30.0/24        │
├───────────────────┼──────────────────┼────────────────────────┤
│ /cmd_vel, /odom   │ /camera/image    │ SSH, Prometheus         │
│ /joint_states     │ /pointcloud      │ Log collection          │
│ /e_stop           │ /map, /rosbag    │ Fleet mgmt API          │
├───────────────────┼──────────────────┼────────────────────────┤
│ LOW LATENCY       │ HIGH BANDWIDTH   │ RESTRICTED ACCESS       │
│ QoS: RELIABLE     │ QoS: BEST_EFFORT │ Jump host / VPN + 2FA  │
└──────────────────