triage-validation

TRIAGE & VALIDATION

One wrong answer = STOP this finding. Kill the finding. Move on to the next test class.

Scope of "STOP" in this skill: This skill's gates kill INDIVIDUAL FINDINGS that fail validation. They do NOT authorize stopping the engagement. Killing a finding via the 7-Question Gate just means that finding doesn't get submitted — every other test class in the engagement is still pending. See redteam-mindset "DO NOT STOP primary directive" for the coverage-axis rule.

"N/A hurts your validity ratio. Informative is neutral. Only submit what passes all 7 questions."

THE 7-QUESTION GATE

Ask IN ORDER. One wrong answer = STOP immediately.

Q1: Can an attacker use this RIGHT NOW, step by step?

Complete this template:

1. Setup:   I need [own account / another user's ID / no account]
2. Request: [exact HTTP method, URL, headers, body — copy-paste ready]
3. Result:  I can [read / modify / delete] [exact data shown in response]
4. Impact:  The real-world consequence is [account takeover / PII read / money stolen]
5. Cost:    Time: [X minutes], Capital: [$0 / $X subscription required]

If you CANNOT write step 2 as a real HTTP request → KILL IT.

Q2: Is the impact on the program's accepted impact list?

Go to the program page. Find "Vulnerability Types" or "Out of Scope."

Common tiers:

• Critical: Any-user ATO without interaction, RCE, SQLi with data exfil, admin auth bypass
• High: Mass PII exfil, privilege escalation, internal SSRF with data, stored XSS all users
• Medium: IDOR on specific user non-critical data, XSS on sensitive page requiring click
• Low: Non-sensitive info disclosure, clickjacking with PoC

If your bug maps to a listed exclusion → KILL IT.

Q3: Is the root cause in an in-scope asset?

Confirm:

• Vulnerable domain is on the in-scope list (not *.internal.target.com)
• It's a production asset (not staging/dev unless explicitly in scope)
• It's not a third-party service the company just uses (not Stripe, Salesforce, Google Auth)

If out-of-scope → KILL IT.

Q4: Does it require privileged access that an attacker can't realistically get?

• "Admin can do X" = centralization risk = KILL IT (on 99% of programs)
• "Non-admin can do X that only admin should do" = valid
• "Requires physical access / MFA device" = usually invalid
• "Requires compromised victim account to work" = questionable, low severity at best

Q5: Is this already known or accepted behavior?

Search:

1. Program's HackerOne/Bugcrowd disclosed reports: Ctrl+F endpoint name + bug class
2. GitHub issues on target repo: is:issue label:security ENDPOINT_NAME
3. Changelog/CHANGELOG.md — does it mention this behavior?
4. API docs / design docs — is it documented as intended?

If acknowledged/design decision → KILL IT.

Q6: Can you prove impact beyond "technically possible"?

• XSS → show actual cookie theft or session hijack, not just alert(1) or alert(document.domain)
• SSRF → hit an internal endpoint that returns data, not just DNS ping
• SQLi → show actual data exfil from a real table, not just error message
• IDOR → show actual other-user's data in response, not just a 200 status code

If you can only show "technically possible" → DOWNGRADE severity, not kill.

Q7: Is this a known-invalid bug class?

Check the NEVER SUBMIT list below. If it's on this list without a chain → KILL IT.

4 PRE-SUBMISSION GATES

Run in sequence. ALL 4 must PASS.

Gate 0: Reality Check (30 seconds)

[ ] Bug is REAL — confirmed with actual HTTP requests, not code reading alone
[ ] Bug is IN SCOPE — checked program scope page explicitly
[ ] Reproducible from scratch — can reproduce starting from fresh session
[ ] Evidence ready — screenshot, response body, or video

Gate 1: Impact Validation (2 minutes)

[ ] Can answer: "What can attacker DO that they couldn't before?"
[ ] Answer is more than "see non-sensitive data" (unless program pays for info disclosure)
[ ] Real victim: another user's data, company's data, financial loss
[ ] Not relying on victim doing something unlikely

Gate 2: Deduplication Check (5 minutes)

[ ] Searched HackerOne Hacktivity for this program + similar bug title/endpoint
[ ] Searched GitHub issues for target repo
[ ] Read most recent 5 disclosed reports for this program
[ ] Not a "known issue" in their changelog or public docs
[ ] Google: "TARGET_NAME ENDPOINT_NAME bug bounty"

Gate 3: Report Quality (10 minutes)

[ ] Title: [Bug Class] in [Endpoint] allows [actor] to [impact]
[ ] Steps to Reproduce: copy-pasteable HTTP request
[ ] Evidence: screenshot/video of actual impact (not just 200 status)
[ ] Severity: matches CVSS 3.1 score AND program's severity definitions
[ ] Remediation: 1-2 sentences of concrete fix
[ ] NEVER used "could potentially" or "may allow"

NEVER SUBMIT LIST

Submitting these destroys your validity ratio.

Missing CSP / HSTS / security headers
Missing SPF / DKIM / DMARC
GraphQL introspection alone (no auth bypass, no IDOR demonstrated)
Banner / version disclosure without working CVE exploit
Clickjacking on non-sensitive pages (no sensitive action PoC)
Tabnabbing
CSV injection (no actual code execution shown)
CORS wildcard (*) without credential exfil proof of concept
Logout CSRF
Self-XSS (only exploits own account)
Open redirect alone (no ATO or OAuth theft chain)
OAuth client_secret in mobile app (known, expected)
SSRF DNS callback only (no internal service access or data)
Host header injection alone (no password reset poisoning PoC)
Rate limit on non-critical forms (search, contact, login with Cloudflare)
Session not invalidated on logout
Concurrent sessions
Internal IP in error message
Mixed content
SSL weak ciphers
Missing HttpOnly / Secure cookie flags alone
Broken external links
Autocomplete on password fields
Pre-account takeover (usually — very specific conditions required)

CONDITIONALLY VALID — CHAIN REQUIRED

Build the chain first, prove it works end to end, THEN report.

| Standalone Finding | Chain Required | Valid Result | |---|---|---| | Open redirect | + OAuth redirect_uri → auth code theft | ATO (Critical) | | Clickjacking | + sensitive action + working PoC | Medium | | CORS wildcard | + credentialed request exfils user PII | High | | CSRF | + sensitive action (transfer funds, change email, delete account) | High | | Rate limit bypass | + OTP/reset token brute force succeeds | Medium/High | | SSRF DNS-only | + internal service access + data returned | Medium | | Host header injection | + password reset email uses injected host | High | | Prompt injection | + reads other user's data (IDOR) | High | | S3 bucket listing | + JS bundles contain API keys or OAuth secrets | Medium/High | | Self-XSS | + CSRF to trigger it on victim without their knowledge | Medium | | Subdomain takeover | + OAuth redirect_uri registered at that subdomain | Critical | | GraphQL introspection | + auth bypass mutation or IDOR on node() | High |

CVSS 3.1 QUICK REFERENCE

Common Score Examples

| Finding | Score | Severity | Vector | |---|---|---|---| | IDOR read PII, any user, auth required | 6.5 | Medium | AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N | | IDOR write/delete, any user | 7.5 | High | AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N | | Auth bypass → admin panel | 9.8 | Critical | AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | | Stored XSS → cookie theft, stored | 8.8 | High | AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N | | SQLi → full DB dump | 8.6 | High | AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N | | SSRF → cloud metadata | 9.1 | Critical | AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N | | Race → double spend | 7.5 | High | AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N | | GraphQL auth bypass | 8.7 | High | AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N | | JWT none algorithm | 9.1 | Critical | AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H |

Metric Quick Guide

| What you have | Me